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Abstract:   
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine whether both country 
disclosure environment and firm-level disclosures are associated with 
cross-listing in the USA or London or otherwise.  
 
Design/methodology/approach – The authors test the association 
using a sample of Asia-Pacific firms covered in the Standard and 
Poor's, 2001/2002 disclosure survey, capturing the country-level 
disclosure using the Center for International Financial Analysis and 
Research (CIFAR) score. The firm-level disclosure is measured 
using the S&P disclosure score. The authors conduct a logistic 
regression analysis and a two-stage least squares analysis to 
examine whether the outcome, cross-listing or not, is associated 
with the country disclosure environment and firm-level disclosures.  
 
Findings – The authors find that Asia-Pacific firms from weak 
disclosure environments and having higher firm-level disclosure 
scores are more likely to seek listing in the USA. Further, the paper 
provides initial evidence that these Asia-Pacific firms are as likely to 
seek listing in London as in the USA. No significant difference was 
found in S&P scores between US and London cross-listings after 
controlling for the effects of other variables. This suggests that 
firms that cross-list in London present similar disclosure levels to 
firms that cross-list in the USA.  
 
Originality/value – The paper's findings contribute to the cross-
listing literature on disclosure by showing that the interaction 
between firm-level disclosure and country-level disclosure has an 
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impact on whether a firm cross-lists in the USA/London or not. The 
authors' comparison of US cross-listings versus London cross-
listings provides the first evidence that disclosures of US and 
London cross-listings are not significantly different. 
 
Introduction 
This paper examines the association between disclosures and cross-
listing using a sample of Asia-Pacific firms. Foreign companies have 
a long history of seeking a US satisfy their capital demand (Reese 
and Weisbach, 2002; Lins et al. , 2005). Cross-listing improves 
cross-listed firms' information environment. More analysts follow 
these firms than non-cross-listed firms and analysts provide more 
accurate forecasts for these firms (Baker et al., 2002; Lang et al., 
2003). Moreover, cost of capital decreases for cross-listed firms 
(Baker et al., 2002). Cross-listed firms enjoy a valuation premium 
(Doidge et al., 2004). Benefits such as these attract firms to cross-
list in the USA. However, these benefits come at the cost of 
increased disclosures. Cross-listing in the USA requires that foreign 
firms meet the disclosure requirements of the US capital market. 
Prior literature (Mittoo, 1992) shows that the major cost of cross-
listing is from complying with the disclosure requirements of the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). This implies that firms that 
already provide high levels of disclosure face lower incremental 
compliance cost to cross-list in the USA. It will be interesting to 
examine whether firms' disclosure levels are associated with their 
cross-listing choices given the disclosure environment at home. 
Specifically, whether the home country Center for International 
Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) score and a firm's 
Standard & Poor (S&P) disclosure score and their interaction are 
associated with the firm being cross-listed in the USA, London, or 
otherwise.  
 Our paper contributes to the existing literature by focusing 
on a sample of Asia-Pacific firms. Prior studies show that the 
location of and the familiarity to the firm affect investor interest in 
the firm (French and Poterba, 1991; Tesar and Werner, 1995; Coval 
and Moskowitz, 1999; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner, 2005; Chan et al., 2005). Selecting a sample of firms 
from one region, we are able to control for regional and cultural 
influences that may affect cross-listing choices. Second, we examine 
cross-listings in London as well as in the USA. Prior studies (Hope 
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et al., 2007) focus exclusively on cross-listings in the USA. 
However, London is also a major world financial market and firms 
seek cross-listing there as well. Our data allow us to investigate 
whether there are differences between cross-listings in London and 
in the USA. Third, we extend prior research by examining the 
interaction between firm- and country-level disclosures. Many prior 
studies examine the difference in the country-level disclosure of 
firms that cross-list and those that do not cross-list in the USA. The 
country-level disclosure research assigns a single score to all firms 
of a country. It assumes that all firms from the country provide the 
same level of disclosure. However, this is not necessarily true. The 
S&P disclosure scores, a firm-level disclosure measure, indicate that 
firms from the same country present various levels of disclosure. 
For example, S&P concludes that the disclosure scores of Korean 
firms are spread between 5 and 62.89 (Table, panel B). Thus, it is 
important to examine both country- and firm-level disclosures in 
cross-listing decisions.  
 Following prior literature (Doidge et al., 2004; Hope et al., 
2007), we use CIFAR scores as the proxy for country disclosure 
environment. We further define countries with an above (below) 
median CIFAR score a high (low) disclosure environment. Our 
sample includes 416 firms with both CIFAR score and S&P 
2001/2002 firm score. As of June 2005, 46 per cent of them are 
cross-listed in the USA and/or London. Specifically, 130 are cross-
listed in the USA and 103 in London. We use a logistic regression 
model to examine the association between disclosures and cross-
listing. As expected, we find that the association between cross-
listing and firm-level disclosure is affected by the home country 
disclosure environment. We find that Asia-Pacific firms from weak 
disclosure environments are more likely to seek cross-listing in the 
USA. We also find no significant difference in the S&P scores 
between US and London cross-listings after controlling for the 
effects of other variables.  
[Table 1] 
We conclude that firms that cross-list in London provide similar 
levels of disclosure as firms that cross-list in the USA. Our 
comparison of US cross-listings versus London cross-listings 
provides the first evidence that disclosures of US and London cross-
listings are not significantly different. This is consistent with prior 
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research that UK firms have quality financial reporting. Cheng and 
Lin (2009) find that UK firms choose not to recognize good news 
unless it has been supported by both superior market performance 
and the industry norm.  
 While we test for the impact of S&P disclosure on cross-
listing, it is also possible that cross-listing may affect S&P 
disclosure. Hence, we run two-stage least squares regressions to 
control for the possible problem of endogeneity. The main results 
show that the CIFAR score is not significant but S&P score is higher 
for firms cross-listed in the USA, and S&P scores have a greater 
positive impact on the choice of cross-listing in the USA for firms 
from low CIFAR score countries than firms from high CIFAR score 
countries. This suggests that these cross-listing firms differentiate 
themselves through having higher firm-level disclosures. As a 
sensitivity test, we reclassify our sample firms as exchange-listed or 
not exchange-listed. Our inferences are not changed. Therefore, we 
conclude that our finding can be generalized to both cross-listing 
and exchange listing. We further examine the three components of 
the S&P scores. Of the three component scores, the financial 
transparency and information disclosure score significantly 
interacts with the country disclosure environment in explaining 
cross-listing.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 reviews prior literature and presents our hypothesis. Section 3 
describes our model and sample. The results are reported in Section 
4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis  
Prior research suggests that foreign firms benefits from cross-
listing. Baker et al. (2002) report that firms attract more analysts 
after they are cross-listed and they find that cross-listed firms 
experience a decrease in cost of capital. Lang et al. (2003) also 
observe an increase in analyst following for cross-listed firms. They 
find that analyst forecasts are more accurate for cross-listed firms 
than for non-cross-listed firms. The change in analyst following and 
forecast accuracy has a positive effect on market valuation. Doidge 
et al. (2004) find that the Tobin's Q of cross-listed firms is 16.5 per 
cent higher than that of non-cross-listed firms from the same 
country. In addition, the valuation premium is higher for firms that 
list on the major US exchanges and lower for firms that list over-
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the-counter or placed privately. Cross-listing enhances firms' ability 
to issue equity, which relaxes the constraints on their capital (Reese 
and Weisbach, 2002; Lins et al., 2005).  
 Many of the benefits above relate to disclosure. Studies on 
firm-level disclosures show that higher levels of disclosure reduce 
the cost of following the firm (Merton, 1987), estimation risk (Barry 
and Brown, 1985), and/or information asymmetry (Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985). Firms in Southeast Asia with high disclosure 
quality outperformed firms with low disclosure quality during the 
1997-1998 financial crisis (Mitton, 2002). Foreign firms that adopt 
accounting methods that comply with US Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles attract more US institutional investors and 
exhibit higher US ownership (Bradshaw et al., 2004). Companies in 
emerging markets work on financial reporting and disclosure, 
trying to reduce the barriers to accessing global equity markets 
(Frost et al., 2006).  
 Research shows that the cost associated with increasing 
disclosure is a concern for cross-listing decisions. Mittoo's (1992) 
survey reveals the main costs of cross-listing perceived by Canadian 
firms: meeting the SEC reporting/compliance requirements, 
legal/accounting/investment banking fees, and listing fees. 
Saudagaran and Biddle (1992) examine cross-listings on nine major 
exchanges. These countries are ranked based on their disclosure 
levels. The disclosure of a firm is proxied by the ranking of its home 
country. They find that firms are more likely to list on exchanges 
with lower disclosure requirements than their home country. 
Similar findings are obtained in Pagano et al. (2001) who examine 
the cross-listing decisions of European public firms between 1986 
and 1997. They find that European firms are less likely to cross-list 
in target countries that have higher accounting standards. Miller 
(1999) compares the accounting standards, SEC registration, and 
costs of listing in the USA. Firms on the major US exchanges face 
higher costs and more stringent disclosure requirements. He shows 
that only 29 per cent of foreign firms chose to list on the major US 
exchanges during 1985-1995.  
 If firms are concerned about the cost of increased disclosure, 
we expect that firms with a high level of disclosure are more likely 
to cross-list. This is because the incremental cost of disclosure is 
less for them than for firms with a low disclosure level. A positive 
association between firm-level disclosure and the probability of 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version 
may be accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
 
International Journal of Accounting and Information Management  Vol. 20, No. 1 (November, 2012): pg. 6-25. 
DOI. This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear in 
e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed 
or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
cross-listing should be observed. However, Hope et al. (2007) 
report that the firm-level disclosure is positively related to exchange 
listing but not significantly related to the broader cross-listing. 
Frost et al. (2006, table 8) do not find an association between firm-
level disclosure and the probability of cross-listing versus non-
cross-listing, the probability of cross-listing in the USA versus 
cross-listing in the UK or not cross-listing, or the probability of 
exchange listing in the USA or trading under Rule 144a in the USA 
versus otherwise. We expect this phenomenon to be explained by 
the interaction between country- and firm-level disclosures.  
 Coffee (1999, 2002) proposes the bonding theory to explain 
cross-listing. The bonding theory suggests that firms commit to less 
expropriation of minority shareholders by voluntarily subjecting 
themselves to higher disclosure standards and stronger monitoring. 
Cross-listing in the US market, a market widely recognized as 
having high disclosure requirements and strong public scrutiny, 
demonstrates the commitment. Reese and Weisbach (2002) report 
that cross-listing firms from countries with weak investor 
protection increase their equity issues more than their counterpart 
from countries with strong investor protection do. Doidge et al. 
(2004) find that cross-listing firms enjoy a higher valuation 
premium than firms from the same country that do not cross-list. 
The valuation premium is higher (lower) where the level of investor 
protection in the firm's home country is lower (higher). Separating 
the bonding effect of disclosure from that of investor rights, Hope et 
al. (2007) find that firms from weaker disclosure countries are 
more likely to cross-list in the USA. The valuation premium to 
exchange-listing firms is higher for firms from a high disclosure 
country than those from a low disclosure country. These results 
suggest that the firm's home country investor protection and 
disclosure environment matter.  
 If a firm's home country already requires a high level of 
disclosure and the purpose of cross-listing in the USA is to show a 
commitment to protect minority investors, the benefits from 
bonding will be less for firms from a high disclosure country than 
for firms from a low disclosure country. The positive association 
between firm-level disclosure and the probability of cross-listing in 
the USA will be moderated by the firm's home country disclosure 
level. Therefore, we expect there is an interaction between firm- and 
country-level disclosures. Our test hypothesis is as follows:  
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 H1.  Firms from weak disclosure environments and with  
  high firm-level disclosure scores are more likely to  
  cross-list in the USA.  
 
3. Model and sample  
To examine our hypothesis on the association between cross-listing 
in the USA and the interaction of country-level disclosure 
environment and firm-level disclosure scores, we run the following 
model:  
 
where:  
 
Usind   is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a firm is cross- 
  listed in the USA, and 0 otherwise.  
 
CIFAR  is the disclosure score for the country in which the  
  firm operates, data obtained from Hope et al. (2007).  
 
S&P score  is the firm-level disclosure score based on the 2000  
  annual report.  
 
CIF   is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the home  
  country has a CIFAR score above the median, and 0  
  otherwise.  
 
Emerging  is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the home  
  country is an emerging economy, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Anti-dir  is a measure of anti-director rights in the home  
  country, data obtained from La Porta et al. (1998).  
 
Judicial  is a measure of judicial rights in the home country,  
  data obtained from La Porta et al. (1998).  
 
French  is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the home  
  country's law system is French based, and 0   
  otherwise.  
 
German  is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the home  
  country's law system is German based, and 0   
  otherwise; the base law system is English.  
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Liquidity  is the liquidity of the capital market in the home  
  country, data obtained from Hope et al. (2007).  
 
LogGNP  is the logarithm of the gross national product of the  
  country in which the firm operates.  
 
Leverage  is the ratio of liabilities to stockholders' equity of the  
  firm.  
 
Growth  is measured as the change in the assets of the firm in  
  year t.  
 
Size   is measured as the logarithm of sales of the firm.  
 
The S&P score measures the disclosure level of the sample firm by 
S&P (Patel et al., 2002). The S&P 2001/2002 survey examines the 
annual reports (both in English and the local language) of the 
company for the year 2000. It assigns each firm a disclosure score 
based on the presence of the applicable information items. These 98 
information items cover ownership structure and investor relations 
(28 items, Sub score 1), financial transparency and information 
disclosure (35 items, Sub score 2), and board and management 
structure and process (35 items, Sub score 3). As high disclosure 
level firms incur low incremental cost to cross-list, we expect S&P 
score to be positively associated with USind. The CIFAR score 
measures a country's disclosure environment. CIF is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the CIFAR score is above the median, and 0 
otherwise. Firms from countries with weak disclosure environments 
are more likely to cross-list in the USA (Hope et al., 2007). In 
accordance with our hypothesis, CIF * S&P score will be negatively 
associated with USind. Emerging is a variable that indicates 
whether the country is an emerging economy as defined by the 
International Monetary Fund (2007) in its World Economic 
Outlook report. We include this variable in the model because 
previous research shows that firms from emerging markets and 
firms from developed markets are different. Cross-listing to gain 
access to external financial markets is more important to the former 
than to the latter (Lins et al., 2005). Anti-Dir and Judicial are 
scores that measure protection of minority interests (La Porta et al., 
1998). Firms in countries with weak protection of minority interests 
are more likely to seek cross-listing to signal quality. Firms under 
French -or German -based law systems are less likely to seek cross-
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listing in the USA because their public enforcement is not as 
effective to protect investor rights as private enforcement in the 
common law system (La Porta et al., 2006). We use Liquidity as a 
proxy for the development of the home country capital market. We 
expect the coefficient on Liquidity to be positive. Firms that come 
from weak disclosure environments are also expected to have lower 
GNP. This controls for the influence of home country economic 
conditions. Leverage, Growth and Size are firm-specific 
characteristics. We expect cross-listed firms to have lower leverage, 
higher growth and to be larger in size.  
 Table I, panel A reports how we obtained our sample. The 
sample starts with the S&P 2001/2002 disclosure survey with firms 
from Asia-Pacific, emerging Asia, and Japan. In total, we have 502 
firms, including 33 firms counted twice in the survey. We further 
exclude 33 firms from Bermuda, China, and Indonesia that do not 
have CIFAR scores, and 20 firms with missing data. We next check 
firm cross-listing status from Bank of New York, Citibank and JP 
Morgan American Depositary Receipt (ADR) datasets, and NYSE, 
NASDAQ, OTC, and London Stock Exchange web sites. As of June 
2005, we have 130 and 103 firms listed in the USA and London, 
respectively; 42 of them are listed in both the USA and London. The 
remaining 225 firms are not cross-listed in the USA or London. A 
limitation of our sample is that these firms are pre-selected by S&P, 
but together these firms represent 67-80 per cent of their home 
country's market capitalization (Patel et al., 2002; Standard & 
Poor's, 2007a, b). Therefore, these firms are the most likely to 
access foreign capital markets.  
 Table I, panel B reports the range of the S&P disclosure 
scores, CIFAR scores, number of cross-listed firms, and the 
distribution of the sample by country. The lowest S&P score is 5 for 
a firm in Korea, and the highest score is 77 for a firm in Singapore. 
In this sample, Taiwan has the lowest CIFAR score (58) and 
Australia has the highest CIFAR score (80). More firms cross-list in 
the USA than in London. Countries that have a fair number of firms 
cross-listed in London are Japan, India, and Korea. We extend prior 
studies to examine whether firm-level disclosure scores, in addition 
to CIFAR scores, may explain firm's cross-listing choice.  
 Table II provides descriptive statistics for firms cross-listed 
in the USA (panel A), the London Stock Exchange (Panel B), and 
non-cross-listed firms (Panel C). The statistics show that firms 
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cross-listed in the USA have a lower mean CIFAR score (69.431) 
and S&P score (47.448) than firms cross-listed in London (69.563 
and 51.880, respectively). Non-cross-listed firms have a mean 
CIFAR score of 70.373 and S&P score of 45.548.  
[Table II] 
The non-cross-listed group has a higher proportion of firms from 
emerging economies than the cross-listed groups. US cross-listings 
and London cross-listings exhibit higher investor protection rights 
(anti-director rights and judicial rights) at home than non-cross-
listed firms. The US cross-listings have the most liquid home capital 
market. Firms cross-listed in the USA have lower leverage, higher 
growth, and are larger in size than non-cross-listed firms.  
 
4. Results  
Table III, panel A presents the correlation analyses between the 
indicator variable of US listing and the explanatory variables. The 
Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients are in the upper 
(lower) diagonal. Both sets of coefficients are qualitatively similar. 
We report the results based on the Spearman correlation 
coefficients. For our sample, Anti-dir (coefficient=0.114, p-
value=0.020) is positively correlated with USind , consistent with 
[7], [8] Coffee (1999, 2002). The correlation coefficient between 
CIFAR and USind is negative but not significant (coefficient=-
0.017, p -value=0.726). The firm-level S&P score is positively but 
not significantly correlated with USind (coefficient=0.058, p -
value=0.240). Other variables that significantly correlate with 
USind are Emerging (coefficient=-0.090, p -value=0.068), Growth 
(coefficient=0.219, p -value < 0.0001), and Size (coefficient=0.328, 
p -value < 0.0001). They indicate that firms listed in the USA tend 
to have higher anti-director rights, are less likely to be from 
emerging economies, are growth firms, and larger in size.  
 Table III, panel B focuses on the Pearson (upper diagonal) 
and Spearman (lower diagonal) correlation analyses between the 
indicator variable of London listing and the explanatory variables. 
The correlations show that Judicial and S&P score are significantly 
and positively correlated with the London listing indicator. Firms 
that cross-list in London are also less likely to be from emerging 
economies (coefficient = -0.274, p -value = <0.0001). They show 
high leverage (coefficient = 0.161, p -value = 0.003).  
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 In Table IV [Figure omitted. See Article Image.], we present 
the test of differences in CIFAR scores, S&P disclosure scores, and 
other variables by cross-listing choice. Panel A compares firms 
cross-listed only in the USA (n =88) or in London (n =61); we 
eliminate firms that are cross-listed on both the US and London 
exchanges. The mean CIFAR score of firms cross-listed in the USA 
(69.682) is lower but not significantly different than that of firms 
cross-listed in London (70.016). The univariate analysis shows that 
the mean S&P score of US cross-listings (45.691) is lower than that 
of London cross-listings (52.395). Other variables that are 
significantly different between US and London listings are 
Emerging, Judicial, Liquidity, GNP, Leverage, Growth and Size. 
London cross-listings consist of firms from countries with higher 
judicial rights, less liquid capital market, and higher GNP. These 
firms present higher leverage, lower growth, and are smaller in size 
than those cross-listed in the USA.  
[Table III] 
[Table IV] 
 Panel B compares firms cross-listed in the USA (n =130) and 
non-cross-listed firms (n =225). Firms that cross-list in both the 
USA and London are included in the US sample. The mean CIFAR 
score of US cross-listings (69.431) is lower but not significantly 
different than the mean CIFAR score of non-cross-listed firm 
(70.373). However, US cross-listings have higher firm-level S&P 
disclosure scores than non-cross-listed firms (47.448 versus 
45.548). Significant differences in several other variables are also 
observed. The non-cross-listed firms have a higher percentage of 
firms coming from the emerging economies than those cross-listed 
in the USA (0.440 versus 0.269). US cross-listings experience 
higher growth, are larger in size, and have better investor protection 
at home than non-cross-listed firms.  
 
Logistic regression  
In Table V, panel A, column (I) examines the association between 
USind and country CIFAR score. This model controls for the effects 
of other country-level variables such as Emerging, Anti-dir, 
Judicial, French, German, Liquidity, and LogGNP. The coefficient 
on CIFAR score is significantly negative (ß1 =-0.122, t -statistic =     
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-2.854), consistent with Hope et al. (2007) that firms with low 
country disclosure scores are more likely to list in the USA. It 
suggests that cross-listing in the USA may be a means for firms 
from low CIFAR score countries to signal their quality. Other 
variables significantly associated with US cross-listing are 
Emerging (ß4 =-3.515, t -statistic =-5.404) and German (ß8 =           
-3.081, t -statistic =-3.271). They suggest that firms cross-listed in 
the USA are less likely to be from emerging economies, and are less 
likely to be from German-based law systems.  
 Model (1) in column (II) examines the association between 
US listing (USind ) and CIFAR score, firm S&P disclosure score, 
and the interaction of CIFAR indicator and S&P score (CIF*S&P 
score ). The coefficient on CIFAR score is significantly negative (ß1 
=-0.297, t -statistic =-2.664). The coefficient on S&P score is not 
significant. The coefficient on CIF* S&P score is 0.07 (t -statistic 
=2.558). Firms from emerging economies and German-based law 
systems are less likely to cross-list in the USA. Firms that cross-list 
in the USA have lower leverage and are larger than firms not cross-
listing in the USA. The results here partially support our hypothesis 
that firms from a weak disclosure environment (low CIFAR score) 
are more likely to cross-list, but do not indicate a significant effect 
of firm-level disclosure score (S&P score). This may be due to the 
endogeneity between cross-listing and S&P score. In Table VI, we 
conduct a simultaneous equation system analysis to control for 
endogeneity.  
 In Table V, panel B, we examine whether there are 
differences in disclosures between US cross-listings and London 
cross-listings. We run a logistic regression analysis of model (1) 
with an indicator variable for US versus London cross-listings. After 
controlling for the effect of other variables, the results show no 
significant difference in CIFAR and S&P scores between US and 
London cross-listings. We conclude that firms that cross-list in 
London have similar disclosure levels as firms that cross-list in the 
USA. Unlike prior literature ( Lang et al., 2003; Hope et al., 2007) 
that primarily examines US cross-listings and non-US cross-
listings, our comparison of US cross-listings versus London cross-
listings provides the first evidence that disclosures of US and 
London cross-listings are not significantly different.  
 
Simultaneous equations  
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Thus, far, our analysis is premised on firm disclosure affecting 
cross-listing choice. However, cross-listing in the USA may 
subsequently affect a firm's disclosure score. That is, there is 
endogeneity between cross-listing and disclosure score. We run our 
analysis again using a two-stage least squares regression with an 
instrumental variable estimator for the firm disclosure score. Our 
simultaneous equations consist of our model (1) repeated here:  
[Table V] 
[Table VI] 
 
 
 
We control the effect that cross-listing in the USA may impact the 
S&P firm disclosure scores. We regress S&P 2001/2002 disclosure 
score on an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is cross-listed 
in the USA, and 0 otherwise[1]. Table VI presents the results from 
the two-stage least squares regression. Panel A presents the results 
of model (1). Our results here show that CIFAR score is not 
significant but S&P score is significantly positive. S&P score is 
higher for firms cross-listed in the USA (ß 2 =0.380, t -statistic 
=2.55) and S&P scores have a greater positive impact on the choice 
of cross-listing in the USA for firms from low CIFAR score countries 
than firms from high CIFAR score countries (ß3 =-0.083, t -statistic 
=-1.91). Firms cross-listing in the USA have higher anti-director 
rights and capital market liquidity at home. Panel B presents the 
results of model (2). The coefficient on US cross-listing indicator 
variable is significantly positive (coefficient =3.669, t -statistic 
=3.72). Cross-listing in the USA impacts the S&P scores in 
2001/2002. CIFAR score also positively impacts S&P score. The 
anti-director rights score is negatively associated with the 
disclosure score and the judicial right score is not significant. 
Disclosure scores are lower for firms that follow the French-based 
law system than the English-based system. They are higher for 
firms from a less liquid home market and from a high GNP country.  
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Additional analyses  
Exchange listing  
We next run a two-stage analysis with our observations classified as 
exchange-listed or not. Exchange listing imposes stricter disclosure 
requirements than cross-listing which includes over-the-counter 
and pink sheets. The results remain qualitatively similar. In Table 
VII under model (1a), CIFAR score (ß 1 =0.347, t -statistic =3.11) 
and S&P score (ß2 =0.225, t -statistic =3.80) are higher for firms 
exchange-listed in the USA. S&P scores have a greater positive 
impact on the choice of exchange listing in the USA for firms from 
low CIFAR score countries than firms from high CIFAR score 
countries (ß3 =-0.109, t -statistic =-3.31). The results support our 
hypothesis.  
 
Components of S&P score  
We also run the two-stage analysis with components of the S&P 
disclosure score. The three components are: Sub score 1 , the firm-
level disclosure score on ownership structure and investor 
relations; Sub score 2 , the firm-level disclosure score on financial 
transparency and information disclosure; and Sub score 3 , the 
firm-level disclosure score on board management structure and 
processes. The results are presented in Table VII under models 
(1b)-(d), respectively. The results remain similar for Sub score 2 (ß1 
=0.904, t -statistic =1.88, ß2 =0.505, t -statistic =2.02, and ß3 =        
-0.219, t -statistic =-1.93). The results of interest are not significant 
for Sub score 1 or Sub score 3. Thus, Asia-Pacific firms with high 
financial transparency and information disclosures and from low 
country disclosure environments are particularly more likely to 
cross-list in the USA.  
[Table VII] 
 
5. Conclusion  
This paper examines whether cross-listing in the USA is associated 
with both country disclosure environment and firm disclosure level. 
The sample consists of firms in the Asia-Pacific region that are 
reported on the S&P 2001/2002 disclosure survey. We measure the 
US listing using a dichotomous variable. We measure the country-
level disclosure using the CIFAR score and firm-level disclosure 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version 
may be accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
 
International Journal of Accounting and Information Management  Vol. 20, No. 1 (November, 2012): pg. 6-25. 
DOI. This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear in 
e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed 
or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
using the S&P disclosure score. Coffee (1999, 2002) and other 
studies suggest that firms will cross-list to an environment with 
stronger investor protections to signal their quality. A similar 
phenomenon exists with respect to disclosure. Our evidence shows 
that Asia-Pacific firms from a weak disclosure environment are 
more likely to cross-list in the USA, consistent with Hope et al. 
(2007). Additionally, we find that Asia-Pacific firms from weak 
disclosure environments and having higher firm-level disclosure 
scores are more likely to seek listing in the USA. Further, we 
provide initial evidence that Asia-Pacific firms from weak disclosure 
environments and with high firm disclosures are as likely to seek 
listing in London as in the USA.  
 This paper presents preliminary evidence that a firm's cross-
listing decision is influenced by both country- and firm-level 
disclosures. One limitation of this paper is that our sample includes 
only the firms covered by the S&P survey and they are large, so our 
results may not be generalizable to smaller firms. Our paper is also 
subject to the limitation that we are unable to obtain firm-level 
disclosures at the time the firm cross-listed. We are making the 
assumption that the disclosure level during the S&P 2001/2002 
survey is not much different than that at the time of cross-listing. 
An examination of the contemporaneous association between 
disclosure level and cross-listing choice may be conducted in future 
research when time-series data on firm-level disclosure are 
available. Future research may also examine the consequences of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on cross-listings in the USA versus London 
and other world stock markets. This research may also be extended 
to examine whether disclosure environments and firm-level 
disclosures are associated with cross-listing in the USA or London 
for firms from Europe, Latin America, and other regions of the 
world.  
  
Note 
1. As our S&P disclosure scores are for 2000 annual reports, we run the analyses 
again for firms cross-listed in the USA before 2001. We obtain similar results. 
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Table 1.  
Panel A: selection of final sample 
Number of Asia-Pacific, emerging Asia and 
Japan firms covered by S&P 500   502 
    Less: duplicate firms/disclosure scores  33a 
    Less: firms without CIFAR scores  33b 
    Less: firms with missing data   20 
Number of firms in sample 416 
Cross-listing status of sample firms 
    US cross-listings (NYSE, NASDAQ and 
OTC)      130 
    London cross-listings    103 
    Both US and London cross-listings 
(counted twice)     (42) 
   Total number of firms cross-listed  191c  46% 
   Not cross-listed     225  54% 
Number of firms in sample   416  100% 
 
Panel B: S&P disclosure scores, CIFAR scores, and cross-listing by country 
 
  Range in       CIFAR      US cross-     London cross-  Both the USA Number 
  S&P score      scored        listing             listing              and London             of firms 
Country 
Australia 40-71 80 19 5 5 26 
Hong Kong 44-55 73 17 1 0 20 
India 20.21-62.37 61 20 11 7 41 
Japan 48-67 71 22 71 19 138 
Korea 5-62.89 68 14 11 8 47 
Malaysia 35.11-62.77 79 4 0 0 51 
Pakistan 24.47-48.94 73 0 0 0 1 
Phillippines 12.21-37.76 64 2 0 0 10 
Singapore 50-77 79 3 0 0 9 
Thailand 20.21-65.98 66 7 0 0 11 
Taiwan 14.89-38 58 6 0 0 27 
Total   103 103 42 416 
 
Notes: aThese 33 firms appeared in both the Asia-Pacific and Emerging Asia lists; bwe did 
not find CIFAR scores for firms in Bermuda, China and Indonesia; cthis total indicates the 
number of cross-listings found using data from Bank of New York, Citibank, JP Morgan, 
NYSE, NASDAQ, OTC and London Stock Exchange web sites; dCIFAR scores are obtained 
from Hope et al. (2007) 
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Table II. Descriptive statistics of the variables by listing 
 
Variable   n  Mean         SD         Minimum        Maximum 
Panel A: US cross-listings 
CIFAR 130 69.431 7.432 58.000 80.000 
S&P score 130 47.448 15.386 5.208 77.320 
Emerging 130 0.269 0.445 0.000 5.000 
Anti-dir 130 3.846 1.023 2.000 5.000 
Judicial 130 8.321 2.001 3.250 10.000 
Liquidity 130 1.230 1.355 0.350 4.620 
GNP 130 1,054.150 1,706.680 64.600 4,812.100 
Leverage 130 3.429 8.353 255.274 59.030 
Growth 130 0.116 0.286 20.794 2.117 
Size 130 10.137 2.516 5.569 17.752 
Panel B: London cross-
listings 
     
CIFAR 103 69.563 4.506 58.000 80.000 
S&P score 103 51.880 9.724 15.957 67.742 
Emerging 103 0.107 0.310 0.000 1.000 
Anti-dir 103 3.864 0.755 2.000 5.000 
Judicial 103 9.233 1.406 6.000 10.000 
Liquidity 103 0.779 0.893 0.430 4.620 
GNP 103 3,438.600 2,056.380 163.800 4,812.100 
Leverage 103 3.815 8.177 255.274 59.030 
Growth 103 0.086 0.267 20.794 2.117 
Size 103 8.947 2.997 5.569 17.589 
Panel C: non-cross-
listed firms 
     
CIFAR 225 70.373 6.579 58.000 80.000 
S&P score 225 45.548 12.29=05 13.830 71.277 
Emerging 225 0.440 0.497 0.000 1.000 
Anti-dir 225 3.560 0.972 2.000 5.000 
Judicial 225 7.899 2.230 3.250 10.000 
Liquidity 225 1.055 1.157 0.350 4.620 
GNP 225 1,539.960 2,071.740 59.500 4,812.100 
Leverage 225 3.803 10.645 255.274 136.115 
Growth 225 0.073 0.270 20.794 2.117 
Size 225 8.693 2.721 3.222 17.213 
 
Notes: CIFAR is the disclosure score for the country in which the firm operates; 
S&P score is the firm-level disclosure score; Emerging is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if the country is an emerging economy, and 0 otherwise; Anti-Dir is 
a measure of anti-director rights for the country, data obtained from La Porta et 
al. (1998); Judicial is a measure of judicial rights for the country, data obtained 
from La Porta et al. (1998); Liquidity is the liquidity of the capital market in the 
home country; GNP is gross national product of the country in which the firm 
operates and is in billions of US dollars; Leverage is the ratio of liabilities to 
stockholders’ equity of the firm; Growth is measured as the change in the assets 
of the firm in year t; Size is measured as the logarithm of sales of the firm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version 
may be accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
 
International Journal of Accounting and Information Management  Vol. 20, No. 1 (November, 2012): pg. 6-25. 
DOI. This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear in 
e-Publications@Marquette. Emerald does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed 
or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited. 
Table III.  
Panel A: Pearson (upper diagonal) and Spearman (lower diagonal) correlation 
analyses of US listings and explanatory variables (correlation coefficient,p-value) 
 Usind CIFAR S&P         Emerging  Anti-dir   Judicial   Leverage   Growth   Size 
   score 
Usind  1.000  -0.062  0.016  -0.090  0.097  0.012     -0.041  0.157     0.280 
    0.207 0.747   0.068  0.048  0.804  0.454  0.004  <0.0001 
CIFAR  -0.017    1.000  0.576  -0.036  0.235  0.512  0.031  -0.036  -0.422 
 0.726                 <0.0001    0.464  <0.0001 <0.0001 0.569  0.513  <0.0001 
S&P  0.058    0.443  1.000  -0.259  0.118  0.433     -0.008  0.002  -0.296 
score 0.240   <0.0001   <0.0001 0.016    <0.0001   0.879  0.976  <0.0001 
Emerging -0.090  -0.072  -0.333    1.000  0.151  -0.426  0.074  0.141  -0.027 
 0.068    0.140  <0.0001    0.002  <0.0001 0.182  0.011  0.588 
Anti-dir  0.114    0.343  0.043    0.205  1.000  0.676     -0.102  0.053  -0.499 
 0.020   <0.0001 0.383  <0.0001               <0.0001    0.064  0.338  <0.0001 
Judicial  0.017    0.594  0.509  -0.524  0.521  1.000     -0.102  -0.149  -0.590 
 0.726    <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001 <0.0001  0.065   0.007  <0.0001 
Leverage -0.072    0.051  0.218  -0.010  -0.086  0.020   1.000  -0.053     0.144 
 0.191    0.352  <0.0001     0.855   0.122  0.723   0.245     0.009 
Growth  0.219  -0.050  -0.021    0.221   0.095  -0.186    -0.004  1.000     0.168 
              <0.0001   0.364  0.701      <0.0001  0.086  0.001   0.932      0.002 
Size  0.328  -0.498  -0.317    0.078  -0.329  -0.663   0.177  0.246     1.000 
              <0.0001  <0.0001 <0.0001    0.113     <0.0001 <0.0001  0.001   <0.0001 
 
Panel B: Pearson (upper diagonal) and Spearman (lower diagonal) correlation analyses of 
London listings and explanatory variables (correlation coefficient, p-value) 
  
 London     CIFAR        S&P       Emerging  Anti-dir     Judicial   Leverage   Growth     Size 
    score 
London  1.000      -0.041      0.211       -0.274      0.094       0.259      0.035     -0.059    -0.017 
                   0.404   <0.0001  <0.0001   0.057     <0.0001    0.525       0.291     0.731 
CIFAR  -0.035      1.000     0.576       -0.036     0.235        0.512       0.031     -0.036    -0.422 
 0.475                      -0.0001      0.464  <0.0001   <0.0001    0.569      0.513  <0.0001 
S&P  0.236       0.443      1.000      -0.259      0.118        0.433     -0.008      0.002    -0.296 
score    <0.0001  <0.0001                   <0.0001   0.016     <0.0001    0.879      0.976  <0.0001 
Emerging-0.274    -0.072     -0.333         1.000     0.151       -0.426      0.074       0.141     -0.027 
               <0.0001    0.140    <0.0001                      0.002    <0.0001    0.182       0.011      0.588 
Anti-dir  0.078       0.343      0.043         0.205     1.000       0.676    -0.102        0.053    -0.499 
 0.113      <0.0001   0.383      <0.0001                  <0.0001    0.064      0.338 <0.0001 
Judicial  0.290       0.594      0.509       -0.524     0.521         1.000   -0.102      -0.149     -0.590 
               <0.0001  <0.0001 <0.0001   <0.0001 <0.0001                     0.065     0.007 <0.0001 
Leverage0.161        0.051      0.218        -0.010     -0.086      0.020      1.000    -0.053      0.144 
 0.003       0.352    <0.0001      0.855      0.122        0.723                      0.245      0.009 
Growth -0.076      -0.050    -0.021         0.221      0.095      -0.186   -0.004       1.000      0.168 
 0.173        0.364      0.701      <0.0001    0.086       0.001      0.932                      0.002 
Size       -0.077       -0.498    -0.317          0.078    -0.329      -0.663     0.177       0.246      1.000 
 0.117      <0.0001  <0.0001      0.113    <0.0001   <0.0001  0.001   <0.0001 
 
Notes: USind is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the USA, 
and 0 otherwise; London is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is listed on the 
London Stock Exchange, and 0 otherwise; CIFAR is the disclosure score for the country in 
which the firm operates; S&P score is the firm-level disclosure score; Emerging is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the country is an emerging economy, and 0 otherwise; 
Anti-Dir is a measure of anti-director rights for the country, data obtained from La Porta 
et al. (1998); Judicial is a measure of judicial rights for the country, data obtained from La 
Porta et al. (1998); Leverage is the ratio of liabilities to stockholders’ equity of the firm; 
Growth is measured as the change in the assets of the firm in year t; and Size is measured 
as the logarithm of sales of the firm 
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Table IV. Test of differences in variables by listing 
Panel A: US listings versus London listings 
Variable  US listings  London listings  Wilcoxon-        p-value  p-value  
               (mean value)    (mean value)  Z statistic        (Z-test) (t-test) 
      n = 88         n = 61   
CIFAR 69.682 70.016 -0.880 0.189 0.190 
S&P score 45.691 52.395 2.735 0.003 0.004 
Emerging 0.318 0.066 -3.677 0.000 0.000 
Anti-dir 3.909 3.967 -0.431 0.333 0.334 
Judicial 8.153 9.619 4.936 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Liquidity 1.326 0.607 -4.137 <0.0001 <0.0001 
GNP 414.028 4,156.900 9.389 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Leverage 2.375 4.023 3.189 0.001 0.001 
Growth 0.069 -0.030 -4.041 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Size 9.968 7.883 -7.206 <0.0001 <0.0001 
Panel B: US listings versus non-cross-listings 
  US listings  Non-cross-listed Wilcoxon-        p-value  p-value  
               (mean value)    (mean value)  Z statistic        (Z-test) (t-test) 
Variable    n = 130           n = 225  
CIFAR 69.431 70.373 -0.388 0.349 0.349 
S&P score 47.448 45.548 1.983 0.024 0.024 
Emerging 0.269 0.440 -3.193 0.001 0.001 
Anti-dir 3.846 3.560 2.804 0.003 0.003 
Judicial 8.321 7.899 2.084 0.019 0.019 
Liquidity 1.230 1.055 1.034 0.151 0.151 
GNP 1,054.150 1,539.960 0.242 0.404 0.404 
Leverage 3.429 3.803 -0.405 0.343 0.343 
Growth 0.116 0.073 2.851 0.002 0.002 
Size 10.137 8.693 5.375 <0.0001 <0.0001 
 
Notes: CIFAR is the disclosure score for the country in which the firm operates; S&P score 
is the firm-level disclosure score; Emerging is an indicator variable that equals 1 if country 
is an emerging economy, and 0 otherwise; Anti-Dir is a measure of anti-director rights for 
the country, data obtained from La Porta et al. (1998); Judicial is a measure of judicial 
rights for the country, data obtained from La Porta et al. (1998); Liquidity is liquidity of 
the capital market in the home country; GNP is gross national product of the country in 
which the firm operates and is in billions of US dollars. Leverage is the ratio of liabilities to 
stockholders’ equity of the firm; Growth is measured as the change in the assets of the firm 
in year t; and Size is measured as the logarithm of sales of the firm 
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Table V. Logistic regression of cross-listing indicator on disclosure scores 
         (I)                                   (II) 
Parameter Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic 
Panel A: USA vs others     
Intercept 11.079*** 2.578 10.481 0.981 
CIFAR -0.122*** -2.854 -0.297*** -2.664 
S&P score   0.010 0.510 
CIF* S&P score   0.070*** 2.558 
Emerging -3.515*** -5.404 -1.317* -1.559 
Anti-dir 0.170 0.541 -0.409 -0.873 
Judicial -0.064 -0.330 0.128 0.535 
French -0.155 -0.193 -0.180 -0.155 
German -3.081 -3.271 -5.606*** -3.763 
Liquidity -0.099 -0.330 0.458 0.874 
LogGNP -0.109 -0.305 0.672 1.071 
Leverage   -0.034* -1.560 
Growth   0.260 0.298 
Size   0.646*** 5.605 
No. of observations   416  327 
 
 
Log likelihood ratio X2        5.413          284.246  
p-value              0.144                  0.877  
Panel B: USA vs London     
Intercept -331.675 0.000 -236.151 0.000 
CIFAR 3.890 0.000 3.360 0.000 
S&P score   0.409 1.148 
CIF* S&P score   -0.398 -1.035 
Emerging 68.671 0.000 46.328 0.000 
Anti-dir -15.775 0.000 -12.100 0.000 
Judicial 7.409 0.000 4.881 0.000 
French 18.488 0.000 11.842 0.000 
German -22.238 0.000 10.072 0.000 
Liquidity 19.802 0.000 14.881 0.000 
LogGNP 6.457 0.000 -2.996 0.000 
Leverage   -0.097 -0.591 
Growth   11.131** 1.811 
Size   0.362 0.589 
No. of observations 149  127  
Log likelihood ratio X2  0.000     34.175  
p-value           0.000        1.000  
 
Notes: Significant at: *10, **5 and ***1 per cent levels, respectively; USind is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the USA, and 0 otherwise; CIFAR is the 
disclosure score for the country in which the firm operates; S&P score is the firm-level 
disclosure score; CIF is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the country has high CIFAR 
score (above the median), and 0 otherwise; Emerging is an indicator variable that equals 1 
if the country is an emerging economy, and 0 otherwise; Anti-dir is a measure of anti-
director rights for the country, data obtained from La Porta et al. (1998); Judicial is a 
measure of judicial rights for the country, data obtained from La Porta et al. (1998); 
French is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the country’s law system is French-based, 
and 0 otherwise; German is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the country’s law system 
is Germanbased, and 0 otherwise; Liquidity is the liquidity of the capital market in the 
home country; LogGNP is the logarithm of the gross national product of the country in 
which the firm operates and is in billions of US dollars; Leverage is the ratio of liabilities to 
stockholders’ equity of the firm; Growth is measured as the change in the assets of the firm 
in year t; and Size is measured as the logarithm of sales of the firm:  
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Table VI. Two-stage least squares regression of cross-listing indicator on 
disclosure scores 
Variable Estimate t-statistic 
Panel A: model (1)   
Intercept -26.229** -1.67 
CIFAR 0.000 0.00 
S&P score 0.380** 2.55 
CIF* S&P score -0.083* -1.91 
Emerging 2.822* 1.98 
Anti-dir 1.772** 2.07 
Judicial 0.225 0.87 
French 6.722** 2.27 
German 1.725 0.89 
Liquidity 2.502** 2.27 
LogGNP -0.252 -0.34 
Leverage 0.000 0.000 
Growth 0.000 0.000 
Size 0.000 0.000 
Number of observations 326  
Adjusted R2 -0.009  
Panel B: model (2)   
Intercept -9.519 -0.59 
Usind 3.669*** 3.72 
CIFAR 0.693*** 4.18 
Antidir -4.618*** -4.40 
Judicial 0.615 0.93 
French -13.822*** -4.14 
German -6.713 -1.60 
Liquidity -3.983*** -3.28 
LogGNP 4.155*** 2.78 
Number of observations 326  
Adjusted R2 0.632  
 
Notes: Significant at: *10, * *5 and * * *1 per cent levels, respectively; USind is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the USA, and 0 otherwise; CIFAR is the 
disclosure score for the country in which the firm operates; S&P score is the firm-level 
disclosure score; CIF is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the country has high CIFAR 
score (above the median), and 0 otherwise; Emerging is an indicator variable that equals 1 
if the country is an emerging economy, and 0 otherwise; Anti-dir is a measure of anti-
director rights for the country, data obtained from La Porta et al. (1998); Judicial is a 
measure of judicial rights for the country, data obtained from La Porta et al. (1998); 
French is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the country’s law system is French based, 
and 0 otherwise; German is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the country’s law system 
is German based, and 0 otherwise; Liquidity is the liquidity of the capital market in the 
home country; LogGNP is the logarithm of the gross national product of the country in 
which the firm operates and is in billions of US dollars; Leverage is the ratio of liabilities 
to stockholders’ equity of the firm; Growth is measured as the change in the assets of the 
firm in year t; and Size is measured as the logarithm of sales of the firm: 
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Table VII. Two-stage least squares regression of cross-listing/exchange-listing 
indicator on disclosure scores 
  Model (1a)      Model (1b)          Model (1c)            Model (1d) 
Variable Estimate t-stat. Estimate t-stat. Estimate t-stat. Estimate t-stat. 
Intercept 249.103*** -3.52 -438.579 -0.49 -119.765** -1.96 -166.606 -1.47 
 
CIFAR 0.347*** 3.11 3.376 0.49 0.904* 1.88 1.315 1.44 
S&P score 0.225*** 3.80 1.830 0.49 0.505** 2.02 0.550 1.48 
CIF*S&P 
score 
-0.109*** -3.31 -1.183 -0.49 -0.219* -1.93 -0.498 -1.47 
 
Emerging 2.057*** 3.15 3.931 0.41 4.140* 1.74 5.303 1.33 
Anti-dir 1.864*** 3.27 17.773 0.49 3.243* 1.84 5.824 1.46 
Judicial -0.276 -1.73 -2.822 -0.47 -0.590 -1.3 -0.722 -1.1 
French 6.057*** 3.55 62.502 0.49 7.835* 1.86 -1.716 1.47 
German -1.360 -1.46 -22.620 -0.51 -5.312* -1.84 -8.783 -1.4 
Liquidity 2.756*** 3.65 26.376 0.49 5.495** 2.00 9.357 1.48 
LogGNP 1.605*** 2.97 14.714 0.49 3.653* 1.89 7.047 1.46 
Leverage 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 
Growth 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 
Size 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 0.000 0.00 
No. of obs. 326  326  326  326  
Adjusted R2 0.0109  -0.0403  -0.021  -0.0304 
 
 
Notes: Significant at: *10, **5 and ***1 per cent levels, respectively; Exchind is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the firm is exchange-listed in the USA, and 0 otherwise; USind is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is cross-listed in the USA, and 0 otherwise; 
CIFAR is the disclosure score for the country in which the firm operates; S&P score is the 
firm-level disclosure score; Sub score 1 is the firmlevel disclosure score on ownership 
structure and investor relations; Sub score 2 is the firm-level disclosure score on financial 
transparency and information disclosure; Sub score 3 is the firm-level disclosure score on 
board management structure and processes; CIF is an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
the country has a high CIFAR score (above the median), and 0 otherwise; Emerging is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the country is an emerging economy, and 0 otherwise; 
Anti-dir is a measure of anti-director rights for the country, data obtained from La Porta et 
al. (1998); Judicial is a measure of judicial rights for the country, data obtained from La 
Porta et al. (1998); French is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the country’s law system 
is French based, and 0 otherwise; German is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
country’s law system is German based, and 0 otherwise; Liquidity is the liquidity of the 
capital market in the home country; LogGNP is the logarithm of the gross national 
product of the country in which the firm operates and is in billions of US dollars; Leverage 
is the ratio of liabilities to stockholders’ equity of the firm; Growth is measured as the 
change in the assets of the firm in year t; and Size is measured as the logarithm of sales of 
the firm:  
 
